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WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN
BOY ORATOR, BROKEN MAN, AND THE "EVOLUTION"
OF AMERICA'S PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY

TROY A. MURPHY
H e wanted our religion to rest o n the basis of love and n o t o n t h e basis of force; and, my
friends, when we get down to the root of our government, and the root of our religion, we
find that they alike rest o n the doctrine of human brotherhood-"that all men are created
equal."
- William Jennings Bryan, o n Thomas Jefferson1

If you would be entirely accurate you should represent me as using a double-barreled shotgun, firing one barrel a t the elephant as h e tries to enter the treasury and another at
Darwinism-the monkey-as h e tries to enter the schoolroom.
- William Jennings Bryan, o n his own life's work2
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P e r h a p s more t h a n any other figure in American history, William Jennings Bryan is remembered for specific and identifiable moments of
rhetorical action: t h e much-revered 1896
"Cross of Gold" speech and the much-maligned
Scopes "monkey trial" of 1925. T h e dissonance
between these two events, at least with respect to t h e ways in which political and rhetorical history has traditionally recorded them,
could not be more striking. Bryan, the "Boy
Orator," was, at thirty-six years, the youngest
and most left-leaning candidate ever to receive a major party nomination for the US
presidency. H e is often regarded as the founder
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FIG. 1. T h e Honorable William Jennings Bryan,
1890. Courtesy of the Nebraska State Historical
Society.

of t h e modern Democratic party if n o t much
of modern liberalism. T h e causes for which
t h e former Nebraska congressman and threetime presidential candidate fought anticipated
and buttressed many of the Progressive Era's
largest accomplishments. Years after Bryan's
death, Herbert Hoover would note his legacy
with some bitterness, saying that Franklin D.
Roosevelt's New Deal was merely "Bryanism
under new words and methods."j Bryan would
make a distinctively rhetorical mark as well.
Michael Kazin calls him t h e first "celebrity
politician," a m a n whose oratorical skills
earned him a massive and loyal following of
supporters willing to travel miles just to hear
him speak.4 His barnstorming campaign practices and popular rhetoric changed t h e face of

presidential campaigning, and perhaps presidential governance, by making both candidate and message more immediately accessible
to the American public. For Bryan's many
admirers, h e was a man ahead of his time. As
Myron Phillips put it simply, Bryan was born
"thirty years too soon."5
Yet his performance as a witness in Tennessee w. Scopes, the so-called trial of t h e century,
engenders a much different perception of William Jennings Bryan. W h e n , in the final scene
of lnherit the W i n d , Spencer Tracy laments that
"there was much greatness in the man," viewers of the film version of t h e Scopes trial are
left wondering what that greatness might have
been or how a fall from grace might have occurred so dramatically. According t o b o t h
popular lore and most standard histories of
the trial, Bryan revealed himself as a woefully
ignorant leader of small-minded fundamentalism, a man whose rigid interpretation of
the Bible exemplified a backward defense of a
long-past ethic. H. L. Mencken referred to
Bryan variously as a "zany," a "mountebank,"
"a peasant come home to t h e barnyard," and a
"poor clod . . . deluded by a childish theol~ g ~ The
. " Nation
~
described Bryan's performance as that of a "pitifully ignorant old man."'
Taking his cue from Paul Anderson's widely
circulated reporting o n t h e trial, which proclaimed that "Bryan was broken, if ever a man
was broken," r h e t o r i c a l scholar M i c h a e l
Hostetler describes the various characterizations of Bryan's ostensible demise in the Scopes
trial as t h e "broken m a n narrative."$ T h i s
narrative not only interrogates Bryan's intelligence o n the witness stand and his fundamentalist Christian beliefs, but is premised o n
a n underlying assumption that his anti-evolution crusade was contrary if n o t antithetical
to the progressive causes h e so famously championed for decades. I n t h e influential American Political Tradition, Richard Hofstadter ends
his scathing critique of Bryan with a disdainful view as simple as Phillips's was admiring,
saying that Bryan "had long outlived his time."9
T h e popular images of William Jennings
Bryan that resonate throughout history are at
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times as contradictory yet oddly informative
as applying the adjective "great" to the noun
"commoner" to describe him. Certainly, the
labels "boy orator" and "broken man" are caricatures of Bryan and his career in public life.
Yet history nonetheless has been inclined to
distinguish between a "good" and a "bad"
Bryan, or a n "early" and a "late" one.1° Indeed,
the ostensible transformation from the silvertongued "Boy Orator of the Platte" to the discredited a n d ignorant "broken man" has
enough holding power to warrant a n examination of its causes and a rhetorical assessment
of the events most central to its constitution.
I argue here that at the heart of the transformation lies a consistency. By examining the
"Cross of Gold" speech delivered at t h e 1896
Democratic convention and the "On Evolution" speech prepared and widely distributed
after the Scopes trial, I mean to highlight the
ways in which these texts rhetorically create a
c o n s o n a n t v i s i o n of d e m o c r a c y t h a t is
grounded in the republican ideals of agrarian
community." Bryan's populist rhetoric consistently defends a democratic ideal, expressed
in part through the nobility of "plain people"
and the moral fabric of agrarian communities,
against the attacks of a rapidly changing world
and the "force" of a supposed elite, whether
those elites are t h e bankers of 1896 or the
scientists of 1925.
Highlighting a measure of consistency in
Bryan's rhetorical battles against both "gold"
and "evolution" is n o t intended simply to revise or reclaim a reputation destroyed by what
Edward Larson calls the "legend" of the Scopes
trial.'' Rather, the consistency in Bryan's vision of democracy illustrates a n enduring strain
of democratic discourse that yearns for and
attempts to defend a communal and moral dimension of democracy against a "public philosophy" of political liberalism that emphasizes
individual rights and "brackets" such issues
~
fundamenfrom public d i s c u s s i ~ n . 'Bryan's
talism or anti-evolution crusade need not be
defended today in order to understand how
the impetus to defend those beliefs springs from
a particular understanding of democracy, the

saliency of which is dependent o n the political and rhetorical context in which democratic
claims are made. I conclude the analysis of
Bryan's democracy by suggesting how the ideals h e articulated continue to resonate today,
albeit in much different political and rhetorical forms. Before illustrating how Bryan attempts to define t h e preferred character of
democracy in both t h e 1896 campaign and
the Scopes trial of 1925, I begin by noting the
importance of viewing democracy as a n inherently rhetorical enterprise.
DEMOCRACY,RHETORIC,AND
AMERICA'S
PUBLICPHILOSOPHY
Democracy is more than a form of government. It is also a n idea. In his cultural history
of American democracy, Robert Weibe traces
the historical ambiguity associated with the
meaning of democracy and how it has operated as a n idea throughout American history.
Calling it "America's most distinguishing characteristic," W e i b e wryly c o m m e n t s t h a t
"Americans act as if democracy were too important to define."14 T h e absence of a consensus definition is certainly not for lack of trying.
Virtually every major political figure and social movement has in some way attempted to
utilize the ideals associated with the term to
their rhetorical advantage. As a n idea marked
by such rhetorical elasticity, the ambiguous
and malleable meaning of democracy is perhaps best understood by the discourse used to
define it within specific historical contexts.
Historian Russell Hanson concurs o n the
centrality of discourse in understanding democracy, arguing that American democracy is
itself a rhetorical tradition. While admitting
that "to speak of liberal democracy as a rhetorical tradition may seem a bit odd," Hanson
insists that understanding American democracy by the discourse used to define it provides
a historical specificity lacking in other forms
of analysis. H e maintains that most Americans think of democracy as either a specific
set of institutional arrangements, or, more
abstractly, as that which is somehow superior
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to communism or socialism. However, Hanson
argues "that way of construing it has t h e singular disadvantage of reducing liberal democracy to a set of ideas that seem to exist apart
from or independently of the political institutions and practices they inform."I5
There is n o ahistorical, definitive, or etymological standard capable of determining the
proper meaning of democracy across historical contexts. O n e need not revisit the foundat i o n a l d e b a t e s b e t w e e n Federalists a n d
Antifederalists to appreciate how America's most
sacred ideal was once one of its most scorned
ideas, As a rhetorical construct, democracy is
historically contingent; its meaning, continuously mediated through language and thus
achieving explanatory power in the minds of
citizens, is always dependent o n the manner
in which it is articulated and the context in
which it operates.
Rhetorical inquiry is uniquely situated to
shed light o n how the meanings of democracy
are constituted, change over time, and become
naturalized to the point where they are taken
for granted, becoming t h e "common sense"
that directs action within a given historical
moment. Tracing the ways in which politically sacred ideals such as democracy are invoked in public argumentation across time and
in different contexts is consistent with Michael
McGee's influential theory of t h e ideograph.16
McGee posits that the link between rhetoric
and ideology-between situated, practical discourse and the structures or systems in which
they take o n meaning-is
best understood
through examination of culture-specific and
collectively honored ideographs. "Liberty,"
"freedom of speech," and "equality" are examples of such abstract, normative terms that
contain and express a particular ideological
commitment. McGee describes ideographs as
ordinary-language terms "pregnant" with ideology .I7 In their work Crafting Equality, Celeste
Condit and J o h n Lucaites demonstrate t h e
ways in which the commonsense meaning of
the ideograph "equality" has been "crafted"
through time and by a multiplicity of voices.
T h e y describe how the term "equality" has

undergone "perpetual transformation" since
it was first introduced into American rhetorical culture, continuously serving as a "discursive foundation of American public life."'"
Similarly, democracy may be understood as
a historically contingent rhetorical construct
which is both creator and creation of a "public
philosophy," a foundational set of understandings Michael Sandel describes as "the often
unreflective background to our political discourse and pursuit^."'^ T h e enacted rituals
and rhetorical events operating in the public
arena serve as a n intuitive point of reference
for individuals to make sense of the world, as
well as a source from which a nation might
collectively form its identity.
Seeking to understand the meanings of democracy within specific historical periods thus
highlights both t h e historical legacies and
contemporary continuities t h a t guide t h e
meaning and manner of our self-governance.
Thus, we might view democracy as a type of
rhetorical collage, a mythological construct
whose symbolic meanings "provide a way to
understand such abstract political entities as a
nation and a means (indeed the compulsion)
of identifying with them."20Like a collage, t h e
most salient features of which change with
each successive layer, the meaning of democracy is imbued with layers of history, but is
continually constructed anew to fit the specific context i n which public arguments are
being advanced.
I n the sections that follow, I highlight how
William Jennings Bryan attempts to create and
define a n understanding of democracy appropriate to the rhetorical contests and contexts
in which h e engaged. In the period from the
mid-1890s to the end of his life only days after
t h e Scopes trial concluded, few Americans
were better known-and even fewer were more
often heard-than Bryan.ll Between his 1896
campaign for t h e presidency and his role in
the 1925 Scopes trial, Bryan would become
the "most important figure in the reform politics of A m e r i ~ a . "H~e~would twice more run
for the highest office and continue to speak
out in favor of such issues as woman's suffrage,
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a federal income tax, state initiative and referendum, a department of labor, and campaign
fund disclosure.
In addition to his commanding role in politics, Bryan was one of the most recognized and
popular figures in a series of adult education
and community programs known as circuit
chautauqua. I n his history of t h e circuit
chautauqua and its adult education predecessors such as t h e lyceum, J o h n Tapia characterizes c h a u t a u q u a s d u r i n g t h i s era as p a r t
education, part entertainment, and part vehicle for social change.13 Leroy Ashby concurs
o n the importance of the chautauqua, describing it as t h e "centerpiece of American mass
culture from t h e 1890s i n t o t h e 1 9 2 0 ~ . " ~ ~
Chautauquas, which enjoyed the most popularity throughout the rural Midwest, provided
a forum in which speakers such as Bryan commonly invoked t h e value of rural life and t h e
ideal character of agrarian c ~ m r n u n i t i e s . ~ ~
In both politics and mass culture, Bryan
loomed o n t h e national stage like n o other
public figure. William Allen White argues that
FIG. 2. WilliamJennings Bryan, c. 1896. Courtesy
Bryan "influenced t h e thinking of the Amerio f Nebraska State Historical Society.
can people more profoundly than any other
man of his generation."16 His views, perhaps
as important as any figure of the era, begin to
map t h e rhetorical terrain of American democracy. I begin t h e analysis with his most
government? Throughout most of t h e nation's
recognized speech and the most heralded of
history, t h e United States recognized both
his campaigns, the "Cross of Gold" and the
gold and silver, t h e latter metal backing the
1896 pesidential campaign.
dollar at a ratio of "sixteen t o one," meaning
sixteen times as many grains of silver as gold
THECRIME
OF '73: CRUCIFYING
MANwere required to constitute a n equivalent dolOF GOLD"
KIND ON A "CROSS
lar.
T h e Coinage A c t of 1873 officially demonN o issue received more popular and politietized silver, placing t h e nation o n the single
cal attention i n the era immediately precedgold standard. T h e "Crime of '73," as it being t h e rise of t h e populist movement and
came known to populist reformers, quickly
Bryan's first candidacy for president in 1896
achieved symbolic status as a conspiratorial
than t h e "money question." Roughly speakact by t h e monied classes, acting through the
ing, t h e question revolved around both t h e
legislatures, to continue a contracted money
quantity and the basis of t h e nation's money
supply, thereby effectively weighing t h e
economy against those who borrowed money
supply: would t h e U S government base its
monetary system o n a standard of gold, a
and in favor of t h e capital-holding class. Stacombination of gold and silver (bimetallism),
bilizing t h e economy of a rapidly growing naor paper dollars backed by the credit of the
tion and achieving a "sound" dollar was of
-

-
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course not as simple as many populist reform.
ers believed. By the time of Bryan's campaign,
various legislative actions amended and modified the original act of 1873, but the gold standard as a "crime" remained salient to populist
reformers. T h e symbolism of gold versus silver
fit quite neatly within a populist framework
that Richard Hofstadter describes as "social
dualism," a persistent division between "two
nations," rhetorically drawn in various ways
but often succinctly understood as a distinction between the "robbers" and the
Bryan's knowledge of monetary policy was
perhaps limited. H e once proclaimed that h e
was for free silver because the people of Nebraska were for it and that h e would look up
the arguments later. More important to Bryan
was his certainty that larger issues revolved
around the money question. In his view, the
money issue was about democracy and the right
of people to govern themselves.
Bryan took the stage in Chicago in defense
of a n honored principle, a cause h e described
as nothing less than the "cause of h ~ m a n i t y . " ~ ~
Suggesting that the contest at issue in the convention and campaign cannot be reduced to
individuals, Bryan claims h e is merely acting
under "binding and solemn instructions" of
those for whom h e speaks, the "plain people"
of the country.29Their judgment o n the silver
issue has already been rendered, and they,
being "equals before the law," have come to
say to the gold delegates whose supposed experience in the world of business afforded them
a greater understanding of business issues, you
"have made the definition of business man too
limited in its application."30I n a series of rhetorical divisions, Bryan speaks for the "broader
class of business man," contrasting the employed and the employer, the country lawyer
and corporate counsel, the farmer who "goes
forth in the morning and toils all day" and the
"man who goes upon the board of trade and
bets upon the price of grain." H e maintains
that the man working in the mines is as much
a businessman as the "few financial magnates
who, in a back room, corner the money of the
~orld."~'

By broadening the definition of "businessman" to include the "plain people" of the country, Bryan expands the principle of equality to
the principles of democracy and democratic
decision making. While h e states that "we say
n o t one word against those who live upon the
Atlantic coast," the rhetorical division, t h e
social dualism between the robbers and the
robbed, t h e monied interests and t h e hard
working-laborers, the Eastern cities and t h e
farms and prairies of the West, is clear throughout Bryan's initial development of the silver
issue.32
In his recent analysis of the "Cross of Gold"
speech, William Harpine argues that the consistent and often stark divisions drawn by Bryan
throughout t h e address are best understood
rhetorically as a radical form of " p ~ l a r i z a t i o n . " ~ ~
I n this polarizing rhetoric, the gold standard
serves as a "flag issue," a concrete way of symbolizing more widespread divisions through
the creation of a common and identifiable
enemy. While often appropriate for solidifying support among like-minded constituencies, as i n s o c i a l m o v e m e n t s , H a r p i n e
maintains Bryan's confrontational use of the
gold standard polarized potential voters and
contributed to-his electoral defeat.34
While it is accurate to suggest that Bryan
uses the gold standard as a flag issue in opposition to bankers and organized wealth of the
East, it is equally important to recognize and
appreciate that the divisions h e created were
based upon and symbolic of his vision of equality and American democracy. T h a t is, Bryan's
opposition to the gold standard and its supporters stemmed from his belief that both were
abjectly undemocratic. In speaking for t h e
"hardy pioneers" of the West who are as deserving as anyone to be heard in a democracy,
Bryan establishes his constituency's position
as both defensive and democratic. H e states:
"[Wle d o n o t come as aggressors. Our war is
not a war of conquest; we are fighting in the
defense of our homes, our families, and posterity." This defense has been democratically
waged before, yet the plain people's "petitions
have been scored," "entreaties have been dis-
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regarded," and their begging has been mocked.
Having established these people's own democratic legitimacy by illustrating that they have
indeed followed democratic procedures, Bryan
can more authoritatively demand their voices
be heard: "[Wle beg n o longer, we entreat n o
more; we petition n o more. W e defy them."35
I n turning directly to the role of monetary
policy in democracy, Bryan makes explicit the
relationship between the money question and
t h e principles of democracy by essentially
equating the two. Intimating the historically
contingent nature of democracy, h e states:
"[Tlhe principles upon which Democracy rests
are as everlasting as the hills, but . . . they
must be applied to new conditions as they
arise."j6 T h e newest condition is t h e right to
coin and issue money, which Bryan and his
followers believe is a function of government.
Again, Bryan makes the contrast clear by honoring sacred traditions and ideals of American
democracy: "Those who are opposed to this
proposition tell us t h a t t h e issue of paper
money is a function of the bank, and that the
Government ought to go out of the banking
business. I stand with Jefferson rather than
with them, and tell them, as h e did, that the
issue of money is a function of government,
and that the banks ought to go out of t h e
governing business."37
Standing with Jefferson and o n the side of
the sovereign democratic citizens of the West
and Great Plains, with the "struggling masses"
rather than the "idle holders of capital," Bryan
asks his audience where the Democratic party
shall stand. In a phrase foreshadowing debates
of modern politics, Bryan states that one party
believes if you "make the well-to-do prosperous, their prosperity will leak through o n those
below. T h e Democratic idea, however, has
been that if you legislate to make the masses
prosperous, their prosperity will find its way
up through every class which rests u p o n
them."3KBryan is not simply making a distinction between the political parties. H e is also
maintaining that America itself "rests" o n the
often less prosperous masses, which Bryan sees
in particularly agrarian form. In one of the

more often quoted passages of the address,
Bryan states: "You come to us and tell us that
the great cities are in favor of the gold standard; we reply that the great cities rest upon
our broad and fertile prairies. Burn down your
cities and leave our farms, and your cities will
spring up again as if by magic; but destroy our
farms and the grass will grow in the streets of
every city in the country."39
Bryan returns to t h e claim that the issue is
as great as any the country has seen, equating
the battle over the money issue with the very
revolution that created America: "Our ancestors, when but three millions in number, had
the courage to declare their political independence of every other nation; shall we, their
descendants, when we have grown to seventy
millions, declare that we are less independent
than our forefather^?"^^ H e assures his audience that this will "never be the verdict of our
people" and concludes with t h e phrase that
gave t h e address its name: "Having behind us
the producing masses of the nation and the
world, supported by the commercial interests,
the laboring interests, and toilers everywhere,
we will answer their demand for a gold standard by saying to them: You shall not press
down upon the brow of labor this crown of
thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a
cross of gold."41
Several themes inherent to Bryan's vision
of democracy emerge from the "Cross of Gold"
speech. First, and perhaps most obviously,
Bryan consistently invokes a social dualism, a
rhetorical division which forms the foundation of populism. According to Kazin, populism should be viewed as "a language whose
speakers conceive of ordinary people as a noble
assemblage n o t bounded narrowly by class,
[who] view their elite opponents as self-serving and undemocratic, and [who] seek to mobilize the former against the latter."42 A gold
standard does not serve the interests of the
plain people, the foundation of democracy,
and is therefore itself situated as undemocratic
and elitist. If Bryan engaged in polarization,
h e sought to draw a sharp distinction not simply between the rich and poor, East and West,
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elite and "plain," but, more importantly, between those who believed in democracy and
those who did not.
Second, Bryan grounds his view of democracy in what many scholars have called t h e
"agrarian myth." This myth, often linked with
Jeffersonian ideals, holds t h e simple yeoman
farmer as the avatar of effective self-governance and democratic virtue and t h e small
towns and farming communities throughout
the land as the bedrock of democracy. I n his
book o n the 1896 presidential campaign, historian and Bryan biographer Paul Glad argues
that t h e "agrarian mythn was more t h a n a
theme Bryan employed i n t h e convention
speech, it was the basis of t h e entire campaign. Glad maintains that in the contest between Bryan and McKinley, each attempted
to define democracy through competing myths:
the "agrarian myth," represented by Bryan, and
t h e "myth of the self-made man," represented
by McKinley. Glad makes clear that McKinley
joined Bryan o n the rhetorical terrain of defining democracy, but asserted a different ideal:
"[McKinley] quarreled not with the abstract
idea of democracy but with Bryan's agrarian
conception of it. As committed to the myth of
the self-made man as Bryan was to the agrarian myth, McKinley did not question the morality that came with industrial expansion. . . .
Industry built their morality around Darwinian concepts; and Social Darwinism as the new
system of values came to be called, seemed
plausible to those who had faith in the myth
of the self-made man."43 This "new system of
values" begins to emerge as a public philosophy that forms a n often "unreflective background" to questions concerning industrial
expansion, helping to frame both the question of money and the question of democracy
during the era.
Finally, these themes are emblematic of the
larger mythology of democracy, a mythology
that is simultaneously historical and contemporary, elastic enough to capture various ideals in various historical periods, and sacred to
the meanings and identity of a particular culture. Many questioned Bryan's insistence o n

defining the 1896 campaign around t h e money
question, saying it crowded out many other
issues contained in the platform of t h e Populist and Democratic parties.44 Issues such as
t h e direct election of senators or government
ownership of railroads might have more legitimately alleviated the imbalance of power
at the heart of the agrarian revolt. From a
rhetorical perspective, however, free silver is
not simply a single issue upon which voters
might analyze t h e positions of candidates and
render judgment in the campaign. Rather, t h e
silver issue becomes symbolic of democratic
decision making and self-governance, a rhetorical construct seeking to explain and define a larger reality about the importance and
proper character of American democracy.
Bryan said throughout t h e campaign that solving t h e money question was necessary before
subsequent reforms were possible; this was true
n o t only with respect to alleviating the power
of monied interests in the development and
framing of future reforms, but also because citizens who felt their voices were excluded
needed to establish themselves as a part of t h e
larger governing body.
Eighty percent of eligible voters made it to
the polls o n 3 November 1896; t h e majority of
them voted for William McKinley. Bryan's
popular vote of just under 6.5 million ( t o
~ c ~ i n l e7~million)
's
was more t h a n respectable in light of the powers of the Republican
machine and a staggering disparity in campaign finances. (While figures vary widely,
contributions McKinley received from J. P.
Morgan and Standard Oil alone surpassed the
total fund of t h e Democratic party.)45 T h e
legacy of Bryan's campaign, however, would
be more lasting. As Kazin writes: "Despite t h e
outcome, the conviction at the heart of Bryan's
candidacy lived on in more than a half-century of public rhetoric and action."46 While
the money issue itself faded, its symbolic resonance did not: "[Tlhe idea that the federal
government should routinely take the side of
wage earners and other citizens of modest
means grew in popularity and was the basis for
t h e domestic politics of liberal presidents from

WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN 91
Woodrow Wilson to Lyndon J ~ h n s o n . Thus,
"~~
while Bryan's advocacy of free silver may not
have secured him the presidency, his populist
vision of democracy, a n essential element underlying the entire campaign, had a fundam e n t a l i m p a c t o n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of
democracy that moved into the turn of the
century and the progressive movement.
T h e "Cross of Gold" speech continues to
hold a hallowed place in the annals of rhetorical history, securing Bryan's place as one
of America's great orators in the tradition of
what Kathleen Hall Jamieson calls the "old
stylen of rhetorical eloquence.48 Of course,
Bryan would not leave his mark only with such
a rousing success. If the "new system of values" of Social Darwinism was at the heart of
the debate between Bryan and McKinley, it
would only become further solidified as a common background for politics in the proceeding twenty years. Bryan continued to contest
the view, eventually taking his battle to the
place h e saw as t h e first line of defense:
America's public schools.

THECRIMEOF '22: CRUCIFYING
MANKIND ON "GUESSESTHATENCOURAGE
GODLESSNESS"

If t h e dualism between the plain people
and the educated elite was a staple of the populist language Bryan employed throughout his
1896 campaign, a potential irony finds t h e
first decade of the twentieth century bringing
more and more Americans into both high
schools and land-grant universities across the
country as the progressive movement began
to take shape. Citing a "phenomenal expansion" in public education, Eric Goldman reports that even a college degree was "nothing
spectacular for the child of a moderately successful farmer" by the end of the decade.49Such
enlightenment could not, however, stave off
the anxiety and confusion many Americans
felt toward rapidly advancing technology and
the increasingly grand scale of modern industrial life. By the 1920s, influential writers such

as Walter Lippmann remarked o n a crisis of
democracy and the loss of a n American "public" brought o n by modern influences, especially the mass media. Lippmann's Public Opinion,
published in 1922, argued that the nature of
A m e r i c a n democracy h a d fundamentally
changed since its inception. Given the complexity of the modern world, h e contended
the average American was in many ways n o
longer cpalified to make judgments o n the
important matters of the day. Lippmann rejected the "democratic fallacy" of self-rule and
argued that government should be directed
primarily by a more elite class of experts.
Lippman would continue to question competency in his sequel volume, The Phantom Public, where h e wrote: "The 'omni-competent
citizen' capable of effectively acting within a
modern democracy is a 'false ideal,' it is unattainable. T h e pursuit of it is mi~leading."~'In
the context of a modern, urban, and industrial
society, h e summed up his view of the citizen:
"The number of mice and monkeys known to
have been deceived in laboratories is surpassed
only by the hopeful citizens of a d e m ~ c r a c y . " ~ '
Lippmann advocated bureaus of experts who
would organize issues into more manageable
frames, allowing for a limited form of citizen
input that would more readily approximate
what citizens were actually capable of providing.
If Lippmann was t h e most noted for his
analytical insight, h e was certainly not the
only one questioning t h e efficacy of popular
democracy during this period. O u t of this confusion-indeed, arguably because of this confusion-progressive
leaders began to take a
more national orientation to t h e practice of
democracy a n d democratic reform. Many
progressives enveloped populist beliefs in widespread popular democracy, but they attempted
to model democratic governance o n the basis
of a unified, national community whose interests were best determined through the objectivity p o v i d e d by a scientific elite. James
Morone characterizes the development as two
competing forms of progressivism. T h e first
group, represented in part by Lippmann, em-
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braced the great scale of twentieth-century
America and spoke for a constituency of a
single, national people. T h e alternative group,
representing a more traditionally "populist"
vision espoused by Bryan, believed "democracy resided in the 'collective will' of small
communities across A m e r i ~ a . " ~ ~
While often looking "wistfully to Jefferson"
and invoking republican ideals associated with
the agrarian myth, Morone argues that progressive practices increasingly became closer
t o Lippmann t h a n to Jefferson. H e writes,
"[Tlhe Progressives pushed democracy back
o n the people, then seemingly snatched it
safely away to the expert."53In 1925 the issue
of teaching the theory of evolution in public
schools stood at the center of this debate concerning the scope of democracy and the proper
role of expertise in an increasingly complex
world. Aside from famed writers such as H. L.
Mencken who were unapologetic in their dismissal of democracy, many progressives found
the distinctions precarious to manage. In a
letter to friend and famed jurist Learned Hand
about the Scopes trial, Lippmann wrote: "I
want your advice badly o n the Tennessee case."
Citing others who believed the "constitutionality of the law ought not be attacked" because "such foolishness ought to be within the
province of the legislature," Lippmann offered
his own views o n whether and when democracy ought to be followed: "Now I know this is
progressive dogma as we all accepted it in the
days when the courts were knocking out the
laws we wanted." Perhaps speaking for many,
Lippmann continued, "My own mind has been
getting steadily antidemocratic: the size of the
electorate, the impossibility of educating it
sufficiently, the fierce ignorance of these millions of s e m i - l i t e r a t e p r i e s t r i d d e n a n d
parsonridden people have got me to the point
where I want to confine the actions of majorities."54
In his Pulitzer Prize-winning history of the
Scopes trial, Edward Larson explains the case
in democratic terms. H e argues, "[Tlhe issues
raised by the Scopes trial and legend endure
precisely because they embody the character-

istically American struggle between individual
liberty and majoritarian democracy, and cast
it in the timeless debate over science and relig i ~ n . " ~Yet
' Larson makes clear that the "legend" of the Scopes trial that resonates through
history emphasizes the debate almost to the
exclusion of the struggle. T h a t is, from lnherit
the Wind to many of the most influential histories of the case, Bryan is portrayed as almost
exclusively concerned with fundamentalist
beliefs, a literal interpretation of the Bible,
and antagonistic toward those who would venture to teach evolution in the public schools.
T h e historical narrative of the "broken man"
dramatizes the "fierce ignorance" of the millions, with Bryan as their exalted hero and the
epitome of such ignorance, yet the issue of
democracy is scarcely a part of the standard
history of the trial.
While Bryan n o doubt relished the opportunity to engage in a debate o n the merits of
evolution, it is important to frame his advocacy within a n appropriate context. First,
Bryan saw the Scopes case as primarily about
the right of common people to decide democratically what ought to be taught in their
schools. Leading up to the trial, he commented
o n the case: "I have been explaining this case
to audiences. It is the easiest case to explain I
have ever found. T h e right of the people speaking through t h e legislature, t o control the
schools which they create and support is the
real issue as I see it." T o Bryan, the issue was
again about democracy. As to the question of
evolution itself, h e remarked: "I am not so
sure that it is involved."56
Additionally, Bryan, almost as devout a
Jeffersonian as h e was Christian, did not, as
commonly assumed, seek t o break down
Jefferson's wall between church and state. Indeed, Bryan argued for neutrality o n the matter of teaching evolution versus creationism,
maintaining that the Darwinian "hypothesisn
simply ought to be taught as theory and not
fact. H e did not advocate teaching Genesis
within the schools. As Bryan recognized, the
biblical account could not be defended in the
schools. Thus, Bryan's position in the Scopes
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matter was to him a familiar one of defending
the common people and their way of life from
the forces of a n outside elite. Bryan put it simply: "If the Bible cannot be defended i n those
schools it should not be a t t a ~ k e d . " ~ '
Finally, Bryan was not the intolerant zealot
h e was portrayed as in Inherit the Wind and in
other histories of the case. W h e n the issue of
anti-evolution statutes first arose, Bryan originally withheld his support of the Butler Act,
the law at issue in Scopes, because h e thought
there should not be any penalty associated
with teaching evolution. H e did eventually
support the Butler Act, but agreed with most,
including Governor Austin Peay who signed
it into law, that it would never be enforced.
Indeed, Bryan consistently disagreed with any
penalty and offered to personally pay the fine
John Scopes incurred in the Scopes trial.58
While history has been prone to minimize
the democratic context in which the Scopes
trial occurred, rhetorical studies o n the trial
have traditionally focused o n the distinction
between Bryan's preferred mode of rhetorical
eloquence and t h e constraints placed upon
his advocacy by t h e requisites of t h e legal
forum.59Even though Bryan was once trained
as a lawyer, Kathleen Hall Jamieson illustrates
how the polished orator of political speeches
and chautauqua addresses was ill prepared
for his exchange with Darrow. Jamieson analyzes t h e transcripts of t h e trial and concludes
that Bryan's "rhetorical demise" stemmed from
his own self-definition as defender of the Bible
and from his agreement to defend his beliefs
in a legal forum that by definition emphasized Darrow's strengths as a lawyer a n d
Bryan's weaknesses as a n orator.60 There is
little doubt that Bryan was outwitted, defeated, and embarrassed o n t h e stand. Yet
Bryan eagerly anticipated his chance to define the case in his closing arguments, a rhetorical form more amenable to his talents. It
was only when Scopes pleaded guilty to the
charge and the defense refused their right of
closing statement that t h e case was subsequently closed and Bryan was left hanging
without a n opportunity either t o question

defense witnesses or to give his own closing

argument^.^^
Bryan was defeated and legally outmaneuvered in Scopes, but the popular account of
his being destroyed and broken is questionable at best. As Lawrence W . Levine argues,
"If Bryan left the Scopes Trial 'an exhausted
and broken man' . . . h e did a masterly job of
concealing it during t h e five days of life remaining to him."62 W h a t Bryan did do during
those remaining days was to prepare a speech
that h e would reportedly consider his finest
and that was intended to become the centerpiece of his continuing battle against t h e
theory of evolution. Published after his death
by the New York Times and countless other
newspapers across the nation, t h e speech was
read by millions as Bryan's response to the
Scopes tria1.'j3 Known as "On Evolution," it
outlines his objections to the teaching of evolution and provides insights into how, as the
late Stephen Jay Gould maintained, Bryan
"viewed his last battle against evolution as a n
extension of t h e populist thinking that had
inspired his life's
Arguing against the broken man narrative,
rhetorical scholar Michael J. Hostetler refers
to this "undelivered oration" as a "complex
rhetorical composition, more the work of a n
artful orator still in his prime than that of a
sexagenarian in the throes of premature senilit^."^^ I n a series of five indictments, Bryan
outlines his objections to the theory of evolution and the negative consequences resulting
from its being taught in the public schools. I n
what Hostetler calls a n "evolution of evolution," Bryan argues that the theory of evolut i o n represents a "moral digression." H e
outlines how evolution is degrading to human
beings, contradicts religious beliefs and corrupts individual lives, turns the most educated
citizens against society's pressing problems and
efforts toward public reform, and eventually
"lays t h e blame for World W a r I itself a t
Darwinism's door."66
Bryan's understanding of evolution is deeply
flawed, and undoubtedly more so when his
beliefs are divorced from their proper histori-
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cal context.67 Yet merely refuting the errors
inherent i n Bryan's approach to Darwin's
theory of evolution does little to achieve a n
understanding of Bryan that extends beyond
history's already prevalent proclamation of his
ignorance. T o understand Bryan and how his
vision of democracy is emblematic of a n enduring strain of democratic discourse, Bryan's
battle against evolution may be understood
rhetorically as similar to his fight against the
gold standard. Like the elephant entering the
treasury, the monkey entering t h e schoolroom
becomes a symbol around which Bryan's defense of democracy converges.
I n "On Evolution," Bryan again claims to
be speaking in defense of a "majority" of plain
people against the forces of a n undemocratic
elite. Recognizing the Constitution, h e states:
"The majority is n o t trying to establish a religion or to teach it-it is trying to protect itself
from the efforts of a n insolent minority to force
irreligion upon the children under the guise of
teaching science.'"j8 I n opposition to true science, Bryan casts evolution as mere "hypothesis" strung together, "guesses that encourage
godlessness." Renewing the populist defense,
Bryan asks rhetorically: "What right has a little
irresponsible oligarchy of self-styled intellectuals to demand control of the schools of the
United state^?"^^ T h e rhetorical division evident in this contest is expressed, as it was
twenty-nine years previous, as a n effort to protect the common people and their way of life
from the forces of a n "insolent minority" of
"supposedly superior intellects." I n place of
bankers, traders, and monied interests who
"corner the money of the world" in a "back
room," Bryan injects the "the inner circle of
t h e iconoclasts whose theories menace all the
ideals of a civilized society."70 Bryan renews
a n 1896 populist vision of democracy by once
again speaking as mere representative of a
community of plain people against the forces
of a n undemocratic elite. A t the same time,
his rhetorical telos has changed; Bryan is n o
longer fighting for economic well-being or
simple representation, h e is engaged in a battle
for the ideals and values of a civilized and

democratic society. I n doing so, h e relies o n
familiar dualities, contrasting the ordinary and
the expert, the community and the individual,
shared values and scientific hypothesis. T h e
nobility of the ordinary man, rural virtue, and
the values of a n agrarian community had always been a n essential part of t h e agrarian
myth but had become increasingly lost in the
context of the early twentieth century and the
nationalization of t h e progressive ideal.
While one can certainly question Bryan's
equating all of Darwinism and evolutionary
theory with a "survival of the fittest" mentality against which h e also waged battle in 1896,
it is clear that h e believed this formerly "new
system of values" was n o longer new and was
now a serious threat to American democracy.
Explicitly invoking Jefferson's distinction between brotherhood and force, Bryan writes:
"Within half a century the 'Origins of Species' had become the Bible of the doctrine of
t h e omnipotence of force." H e continues,
"[Wlhat else but the spirit of evolution can
account for the popularity of the selfish doctrine, 'each one for himself, and the devil take
the hindmost,' that threatens the very exist'
ence of the doctrine of b r ~ t h e r h o o d . " ~For
Bryan, McKinley simply failed to question t h e
morality of t h e selfish doctrine. Darwin made
it popular.
N o t only were evolutionists elitist enough
to believe that they knew better than common people what ought to be taught in public
schools, but, for Bryan, t h e very theory threatened the root of democracy and was a direct
affront to the sensibilities and identity of common people. Bryan cites Nietzsche's condemnation of the "sympathetic activitiesJJ of the
"herd," such as caring for the sick, the maimed,
and the poor, all of which allow the "weak
members to propagate their kind," as evidence
of how such "supposedly superior intellects"
view the common man.72If generally adopted,
the theory of evolution would not only "destroy all sense of responsibility and menace
t h e morals of the
it would also make
a mockery of the common man, and, by extension, Bryan's entire vision of democracy. In-
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deed, it is possible in this light to understand
much of Bryan's consistent antipathy toward
"atheists" and "agnostics" as being born in part
from their elitist dismissal of the common man,
a disbelief in democracy as much as a disbelief
in God.
I n "On Evolution," Bryan speaks as the representative of the plain people in defending
from attack the shared values that constitute
their identity against what Bryan sees as rampant individualism and moral degradation. T o
further understand how h e relates evolution
to the principles of democracy, Bryan's summary near t h e end of the speech is worth quoting at length:

tity and essential to their ability to navigate
that storm.
I n the Scopes trial, Darrow's interrogation
forced Bryan into a dialectic exchange in which
his literal interpretation of the Bible was subject to intensive and widespread scrutiny. A n
examination of "On Evolution" illustrates how
Bryan saw the issue of evolution as a danger to
democracy as well as religion, and how Bryan's
vision of democracy, largely consistent with
his views in 1896, rests upon a n enduring strain
of democratic discourse that is grounded in
t h e agrarian myth and the ideals of civic republicanism and Jeffersonian democracy.

CONTINUITIES
AND CONCLUSIONS
Let us, then, hear the conclusion of the
whole matter. Science is a magnificent material force, but it is not a teacher of morals.
It can perfect machinery, but it adds n o
moral restraints to protect society from the
misuse of t h e machine. It can also build
gigantic intellectual ships, but it constructs
n o moral rudders for the control of stormtossed human vessels. It n o t only fails to
supply the spiritual element needed, but
some of its unproven hypotheses rob the
ship of its compass and thus endanger its
cargo.74
It is not questioning Bryan's biblical foundation or his commitment to the fundamentalist movement to suggest that underlying his
crusade against evolution lies a n equally exigent concern about American democracy. In
what seems a thinly veiled reference to his
progressive friends and their reliance o n science and expertise as a means of democratic
governance, Bryan maintains that the "ship"
of state requires a moral and spiritual element
as well as a n intellectual one. Further, it is of
little doubt that Bryan would have considered
the Roaring Twenties a storm, and that guidance and direction for democracy were more
needed than ever. A n d evolution, the "unproven hypothesisn of a n elitist class, is intent o n once again "robbing" t h e cargo of
democracy of something central to their iden-

William Allen White summed up Bryan's
political career by calling him "the best political diagnostician and the worst political practitioner the country had ever seen: never had
h e been wrong o n a single diagnosis or right
o n a single solution."75Hardly a supporter of
Bryan, the noted journalist acknowledges that
Bryan had a "curious instinct" for sensing
"when things were wrong." Leroy Ashby concurs, saying that this "instinct had again and
again guided him into t h e camps of people
anxious about the future- people worried that
the events were rendering them s u p e r f l u ~ u s . " ~ ~
A distinction between diagnosis and practice in a n age of democratic anxiety may provide a useful frame in which to conclude the
present analysis and begin to understand how
Bryan's vision of democracy continues to resonate within contemporary American politics.
Assessing the "discontents" of American democracy at the turn of the twenty-first century, Michael Sandel argues that two concerns
lie at the heart of present anxieties: "One is
the fear that, individually and collectively,
we are losing control of the forces that govern
our lives. T h e other is t h e sense that, from
family to neighborhood to nation, the moral
fabric of community is unraveling around
From economic insecurity to a perceived
loss of shared values, Sandel argues t h a t
American politics is "ill equipped to allay the
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discontent that now engulfs it" because the
public philosophy by which we live cannot
"speak convincingly about self-government
and ~ o m m u n i t y . " ~ ~
In tracing political and legal precedents in
the creation of what h e calls a "procedural
republic," Sandel illustrates how the administrative or procedural form of political liberalism that frames contemporary public life has
crowded out a more republican, "civic strand"
of discourse that has traditionally animated
the ideals of American democracy. Liberalism
as "procedural republic" emphasizes individual
rights over the public good and necessarily
"brackets" moral and religious questions from
public discourse. T h e state remains neutral
toward what constitutes a good life, and individuals, when entering the political sphere,
must free themselves of their moral identity
and commit to a form of political debate in
which constitutive elements of their identity
are "bracketed" from public discourse.
Sandel argues that such bracketing engenders a particularly vapid and potentially harmful form of public discourse. H e writes: "A
politics that brackets morality and religion
too completely soon generates its own disenchantment. Where political discourse lacks
moral resonance, the yearning for a public life
of larger meanings finds undesirable express i o n ~ . "In~ ~
criticizing the "intolerant moralisms" of groups such as the Moral Majority,
Sandel argues that a more pluralistic and tolerant form of community and public life, capable of satisfying t h e persistent yearning for
larger meaning, is dependent first o n norms of
discourse that are more amenable to a liberally based understanding of community. T h e
public philosophy operating in contemporary
American politics does n o t allow for such a
discourse. Writing in 1994, Sandel might well
have been assessing the American context and
prevailing public philosophy of seventy years
earlier when h e notes: "Fundamentalists rush
in where liberals fear to tread."*O
W e might recall how this same yearning for
a more communally based and meaningful form
of democracy, what Morone calls America's

e n d u r i n g "democratic wish," framed t h e
progressives' use of Jefferson and the agrarian
ideal of community, but in practice lacked
forms of organization a n d association t h a t
would transform such ideals into realities.
Today, a n important and growing element of
contemporary democratic theory emphasizes
related ideals of community and civic republicanism by advocating methods of achieving a
stronger, more engaged, and more deliberative form of American democracy. Ranging
across a broad ideological spectrum, such theorists note the importance of community and
associational life in cultivating democratic
citizens who both contest and complement
institutions of democratic self-governance.
Certainly, I am n o t equating the fundamentalism of William Jennings Bryan with such
theories. As I have tried to show, however, a n
analysis of Bryan reveals that both the problems h e diagnosed and t h e themes h e invoked
to address those problems continue to resonate today.
I n a passage of Bryan's "Cross of Gold"
speech highlighted earlier, Bryan reminded the
Democratic convention that "the principles
upon which Democracy rests are as everlasting as the hills, b u t . . . they must be applied to
new conditions as they arise." I n assessing
Bryan's less successful role as political practitioner, we might look beyond both "silver"
and "anti-evolution" to appreciate how the
possibility of achieving the democratic principles for which h e fought would require a
sustained form of democratic practice t h a t
William Jennings Bryan as beloved "celebrity
politician" would be perhaps least equipped to
provide. T h a t is, a "Bryanesque" democracy
based o n Jeffersonian principles and agrarian
ideals would necessarily be more participatory,
engaged, and deliberative than a traditional
firebrand populism may allow. T h e ideals of
equality and community, which Bryan helped
usher into the Progressive Era and which still
resonate today, may have lost their constitue n t ties in a n age of rapid industrialization,
rising consumerism, and a nationalization of
the progressive movement. If democracy was
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"snatched safely away to the expert" during
this era, it likely remains there today, and various forms of community and associational life
might provide the best hope for citizens to
reclaim it again. This would put the onus for
democracy directly back o n citizens, requiring
more peers and fewer "peerless leaders," but it
would be in line with a vision of democracy
Bryan consistently defended.
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